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Summary findings
Using a model of aid fungibility, Feyzioglu, Swaroop,  communication sector are fully nonfungible. But loans to
and Zhu examine the relationship between foreign aid  the energy sector are converted into fungible monies and
and public spending.  part of the funds leak into transport  and communi-
Based on a panel of cross-country and time-series data,  cations. Loans to agriculture and education are also
their results show that roughly 75 cents of every dollar  fungible.
given in net development assistance goes to current  There is no evidence of concessionary funds being
spending and 25 cents to capital spending in the  diverted for military purposes.
recipient countries. But concessionary loans - a  Their results show that total public spending in the
component  of development assistance  - stimulate far  health sector has no impact on reducing infant mortality,
more government spending.  but concessionary loans to the health sector do. This
Their results also show that aid increases both public  finding leads Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu to conclude
and private investment.  that linking foreign aid to an agreed-upon public
To test aid fungibility across public spending  spending program in areas critical to development might
categories, they use a newly constructed data series on  be an effective way to transfer resources to developing
the net disbursement of concessionary loans. They find  countries.
that concessionary loans given to the transport and
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Roughly $1.4 trillion' -- an amount nearly equal to the current GDP of Germany -- has flown
from  rich to  poor  countries in foreign aid since 1960.  In  1991, net disbursement of Official
Development  Assistance (ODA) 2 to low- and middle-income countries 3 was over $47 billion or
roughly 1.4 percent of their combined GNP (World Bank [1994]).  Of this, $16.2 billion went to the
Sub-Saharan African  countries -- the poorest regional group -- accounting for 9.3 of their GNP.  In
Mozambique  alone, listed as the poorest country in terms of per capita GNP, net disbursement of
ODA was close to $1 billion, or nearly 70 percent of its GNP.
To judge the effectiveness  of such assistance, one needs to examine its impact, inter alia, on
economic  growth and poverty  alleviation. An extensive literature has studied such effects of foreign
aid programs. 4 By providing assistance, donor agencies, among other things, attempt to influence
the public-expenditure policies of recipient governments. Governments undertake expenditures to
pursue a variety of goals including growth in per-capita income and income redistribution.  In order
to gain better insights into the relationship between aid and such output indicators, it is therefore
important to analyze how aid influences the public sector's budgetary allocation.
The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between foreign aid and the level --
aggregate as well as sectoral -- of public spending in recipient countries.  In particular, the focus is
on the relationship  between aid -- including  aid as a whole as well as sector-specific, earmarked aid --
'in 1988  dollars.
2Defined  as  grants  and  loans  made  on concessional  financial  terms  (i.e.,  having  a grant  element  of at least
25 percent), by all bilateral  official  agencies  and multilateral  sources  to promote  economic  development  and
welfare  in developing  countries  (see OECD,  1994  for details).
3A  total  of 109  countries  (42  low-income  and  67 middle-income)  with a per-capita  GNP  of up to $8,355.
4See White  and Luttik  [1994]  and Obstfeld  11995]  for a survey  of foreign  aid work.2
and components of public expenditure, current and capital on the one hand, and education.,  health.
infrastructure and defense on the other hand.  The paper also analyzes the impact of foreign aid on
some human development indicators.
The link between foreign  aid and public spending  is not straightforward  because some aid mav
be "fungible."  An aid recipient country could render earmarked aid fungible by reducing its own
resources  from the sector which receives aid and transferring it to other sectors of the budget.
Foreign aid induces changes in the recipient country's budgetary allocation, although the magnitude
of change  depends, among other things, upon the size of the aid relative to the recipient's own
resources.  Increasingly the donor community is  getting concerned that development assistance
earmarked  for critical social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund
unproductive military  expenditures  (see UNDP, 1994, for an analysis of the human development cost
of arms imports  in developing countries).  Given that a significant portion of aid is provided for
specific  projects or sectors (e.g., projects in agriculture, health, transport etc.), donor agencies would
therefore like to know whether aid is indeed effective in increasing nyet  expenditures in that sector.
or  whether  specific purpose  aid merely substitutes for  expenditures that  governments would
otherwise have undertaken.  In this context, this paper analyzes how fungible is foreign aid across
public expenditure categories.
Section  2 explains the concept of fungibility by means of a graphical analysis.  Section 3
develops  an  analytical framework which links foreign aid with  various components of  public
expenditure. In section 4 we empirically  examine the link between foreign aid and public spending.






2.  Aid fungibility among public spending categories: A graphical analysis
To  assess the impact of aid on the recipient country's  budgetary allocation one needs to
examine  the fungibility  of aid.  Since the concept of fungibility  has been used in several ways in the
aid literature, it is important to define what we mean by this term.  We first postulate a model and
then define precisely  what it means for aid to be fungible  among public spending categories.  Suppose
there are two public goods -- defense and education -- both normal (non-inferior), that a developing
country  government buys in the market to provide to its citizens. It pays for these goods by means
of domestically  generated resources. In addition,  foreign donor agencies provide assistance towards
the purchase of education.  Figure I captures this scenario. The budget line BB'  represents public
spending  choices that can be financed by domestic resources.  Given the preferences of the recipient
country government, point A represents the optimal mix of the two goods in the absence of aid.  A4
foreign donor agency gives an amount G of earmarked aid to education.  Further, suppose the only
condition attached to the aid. one that could be easily monitored, is that total education spending in
the recipient country has to be at least G.  (Below we consider aid fungibility at the margin.)  For
simplicity,  we assume  that there is no impact of aid on the relative price of the two goods.'  The post-
aid budget line is B 'C  'C.
We now define aid fungibility: Given the pre-aid budget constraint, if the recipient country
could treat a portion, 4)  (O<  4< I1),  of the earmarked aid as if it were a revenue supplement then aid
is said tc be fungible. The different degrees of aid fungibility  are defined as follows:
Case 1.  Aid is fully-fungible  if  I  1 and the post-aid optimal mix of the two goods, chosen by the
country, is an interior solution.  The latter requires that the country spend at least some of its own
resources  besides the aid in the targeted sector.  4)  = I implies that the budget constraint shifts
outward by the full amount of aid with a kink indicating the aid conditionality, and if the solution is
interior,  the countrv moves to a new optimal  point associated with a higher level of utility. In Figure
I this is indicated by a move from point A to point E.
Case 2.  Full non-fungibility  occurs when 4 = 0.  In this case the country is not able to manipulate
its resources and is forced by the donor agency to spend all the aid money in the targeted sector.
Given the preferences of the country, such a move is sub-optimal as shown by amove from point A
'To our knowledge,  the only paper that models  the impact  of aid on price changes  is the seminal
contribution  by McGuire  [19781.  In his analysis  the fungible  amount  of aid shifts  the budget  constraint  out and
the  non-fungible  amount  rotates  the budget  constraint  as the relative  price  of the  non-aided  good  in terms  of the
aided  good  changes.5
to point D in Fig:ure  1.
Case 3.  Aid is partially-fungible  if 0 <  ¢  < 1  In this case the country's budget constraint shifts
outward  by the fungible amount of aid.  A kink in the new budget line (not shown in Figure 1)
indicates  that the education  spending  chosen by the country plus the non-fungible part of the aid, has
to be greater (or equal to) the aid amount. The country then chooses an optimal point (if the solution
is interior)  on its new budget line and then adds the non-fungible part of the aid to its education
spending. Partial fingibility  implies  that the countiy is not able to transfer resources from education
to defense as much as it would like to.  This case would be given by a point that lies between E and
D on the post-aid  budget line in Figure 1, and would be sub-optimal (though it would be associated
with a higher level of utility than the case with full non-fungibility).
Aidfungibility  at the margin
In the definition  of fungibility  given above,  we do not treat aid as a marginal dollar after taking
into account the recipient's  pre-aid spending composition.  In reality, however, when targeting aid to
particular sectors, donor agencies take some proxy of what the recipient country would have spent
in the absence of aid. To ensure that the recipient  country spends aid funds in the targeted sector and
to preclude  any switching of funds at the margin, they often impose carefully chosen conditions.
Restricting the switching of funds, at least on paper, seems simple; all what donor agencies need to
do is to figure out the pre-aid levels of spending of the recipient country from its previous years'
budget  documents.  Using this  as an indicator  -- though  not perfect  -- of what the  country  would
have spent in the absence of aid, donor agencies can compel the recipient country to spend the aid6
funds at the margin in the targeted sector.  For example, in Figure 1, if the pre-aid composition of
education and defense spending is known to be at point A. the recipient country could be asked to
spend in addition the aid resources, G, on education.  The post-aid composition would then be at
point D and aid will  be completely  non-fungible  at the margin. In practice, however, there are at least
three reasons  why such monitoring is difficult, if not impossible.  First, domestic resources in
developing  countries  fluctuate by significant amounts from year to year.  Treating past  years'
composition of spending as the pre-aid composition may not be very meaningful if the change in
domestic resources is large relative to foreign aid.  In such situations, recipient countries can easily
switch aid funds among expenditure categories.  Second, when there are several sources of aid in a
country and donor coordination  is not good, aid monitoring becomes extremely difficult. Finally, not
all aid goes through the recipient country's  budget.  In many developing countries, particularly in
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  a portion of foreign  aid  bypasses the govemment budget.  In such cases it might
be difficult to pinpoint the spending requirement for the government.  All in all, monitoring foreign
aid is difficult in practice and so aid fungibility  is essentially an empirical issue.
3.  A Model of Aid Fungibility
Seminal work on modeling aid fungibility  has been done by McGuire [  1978] who proposed
an indirect  statistical method to figure out the shape of the post aid budget constraint of the recipient
government. In McGuire's model an unknown portion, (4, of the grant is taken to be  a pure revenue
supplement to  the recipient and is completely fungible along with the recipient's own fungible
resources.'  The non-fungible  portion, 1 -4, of the grant, on the other hand, changes the price of the
6McGuire  studies  the local  government  response  to federal  grants  for education  in the  United  States.7
subsidized good.  Using a utilitv maximization framework, McGuire derives a system of equations
that  is used to estimate the fungibility  parameter, 4¢.  One drawback of this model is that the aid
recipient is alwavs at an optimal point.  In our view, unless the aid is fully-fungible,  the recipient is
constrained by the aid conditionality and is not at the optimal level.
In this paper, we postulate a variant of the McGuire model which allows the aid recipient to
be at a sub-optimal level.  In our model, which is close in spirit to the framework adopted by Pack
and Pack [1993], the aid recipient government buys S public goods, {g 1 , g2,. ,g-}, in the market to
provide to its citizens.  It pays for these goods by the fungible portion of the foreign assistance and
all other sources, R -- domestic and foreign -- that it has at its disposal.  Following the definition
given in section 2, a portion, 4  (0(p'  1), of the earmarked aid is fungible if it can be treated as a
revenue supplement. Citizens also get to consume goods that the government has to purchase from
the non-fungible  portion, I -(1, of the foreign aid. We assume that by design all foreign assistance is
earmarked by purpose towards the purchase of K (< S ) specific public goods7 and  ak (k =  I,..., K)
is the amount of aid for (ood k.  Public spending on good k has to be at least ak.. Further, let the
representative  agent's utility function. defined on these S public goods and a single private good, c,,
be given by:
=  ~~~NF  %IF
W  U[cp  PI,  g1l  91  I) ...  I  gK  G  I  9l  I ...  I  S]
where  gkVF.=  (l- 4 k)ak  k =  I,.,  K.  (1)
Pk
7An  assumption  not  very far  from  the actual  pattern  of aid  disbursement.  Even  the  policy  based lending
of institutions  such  as the World  Bank  specifv  a negative  list  of goods  on which  the  aid may  not be spent.8
gZx  F is the quantity of the k-th good that the government has to purchase from the non-fungible
portion of the aid earmarked  for  good  k and p5 (s  1....,  S) is the price of the s-th public good.  We
take the fungibility coefficient, ci = {<  ) 1, 4)  2-  ,,4)  K }, as given, rather than deriving it from some
game-theoretic  framework. 8 Moreover, we assume that aid affects the government s optimal choice
of {g 1, g 2,...,gs}  only through the fungible  portion; public  goods purchased from the non-fungible part
have no effect on this choice. 9
The budget constraint faced by the govemment is:
K
P 1gl  + P2g  +2  + Psgs  R  +  Y-'
) kak  (2)
k=1
Taking ps., Sti and a, as given, the government chooses {gl, g2,...,g&}  to maximnize  (1) with respect
to (2).  To get analytical solutions let the utility function be of the Stone-Geary forn:
K  S
U[CP'  g1 g 1 9''F  g.KgK  gK+  I  ... ,  gI]  = F(cD) + H(  gk  F)  +  r  (g  -y)  s  (3)
k=l  s=l
y, s  are the  subsistence quantities and  are positive; aqd 0's  satisfy the  conditiop E  p  =  1.
Maximizing  (3) subject  to the budget constraint in (2) yields  --  if the solution exists and is interior --
8Such  a derivation  would  require  specifying  some  strategic  behavior  on the part of the government  which
takes  into  account  the  penaltv  of being  "caught"  redirecting  funds. While  this may  be a fruitful  extension  of the
research,  we  do not  attempt  such  an exercise  in this paper. Instead,  our focus  is to econometricallv  estimate  the
fungibility  coefficient.
9Assuming  the  latter  is crucial  for the modeling  strategy;  otherwise  the governrnent's  optimal  choice  of
'g1, &, .s  },  if it exists and is interior, will imply that the total spending on each of the public goods --
govern-ment's  optimal  choice  plus the amount  purchased  from  the  non-fungible  portion  of the aid -- is the same
as the  mix  that  the  government  would  have  chosen  if all  of the aid  came  as a pure revenue  supplement.  In other
words,  irrespective  of the  size  of 4)  the  government  could  make  the aid  fully-fungible  as long  as its own  spending
on the aided  good is at least as much as the aid. In such a case,  our definition  of aid fungibilitv  would  be
meaningless.9
the following system of linear expenditure equations:
K  !j
P'gs  = PsYs +  R3R+  Edka  -vP,Y,]  s=l..  (4)
k=1  j  l
Empirically, however, one observes the total spending on any particular good rather than spending
that is financed by fungible or non-fungible resources.  Simple manipulation of (4) leads to:
f.  S
p,g,  =  P,Y,  + (l-+  +-3d,)a,  + PS[RZ  -k.ak.-  EpJyI]  s  ,
where g,  = g  +  g,F  = g  +  (I-4 3 )a
Since  R, the domestic resources of the recipient country, can be written as equal to total government
spending net of foreign aid, G N,  equation (5) becomes
K  s
p3g5  = PSYs  +  (1-  ¢5+P,4))as  +  PS[GZV4kak-Yp,Y,]  s= ,..,S.  (6)
gts  J=1
Empirical Implication of the Model
Using data,  the effect of foreign aid on various components of public spending can be
analyzed  by estimating  equation (6). The paramneter  y,  -- the subsistence quantities of various public
goods  -- can be proxied by social, political and other economic variables.  In equation (6) if the
estimated coefficient  of G , is the same  as the coefficient  of a5 ,then aid earmarked for good s is fully-10
fungible  and  I  =  1.'°  If the coefficient of a , is I then aid for good s is fully non-fungible and 4  =0.
The coefficient of a, being less than I but greater than the coefficient of G V would indicate partial
fungibility of aid, i.e., 0 <  K5  < 1.  Finally, the coefficient of 9  (k￿s)  indicates how much of aid
earmarked for good k is spend on good s.
4. Empirical Analysis
The focus of our empirical  analysis  is the link between foreign aid and government spending.
While the literature  on the effectiveness of aid is replete with studies linking foreign aid with
consumption,  investment  (both public  and private), taxation  and other macro variables, there are very
few  studies  that  analyze the  impact of  foreign  aid on  different components  of  government
expenditure."  As a result, the interesting issues concerning the fungibility  of foreign aid among
public expenditure categories such as agriculture, health, education, transport and communication
etc., have not been researched.' 2 For example, while Cashel-Cordo and Craig [1990] claim to have
determined  whether or not foreign aid changes the composition of government expenditure in a
sample of 46 developing  countries,  the expenditure components in their analysis is limited to defense
and non-defense spending.  Similarly,  in examining the fungibility  of U.S. aid among 8 major aid
recipient  countries, Khilji and Zampelli [1994] look at defense and non-defense expenditures.  Time
series data in individual countries has been used to analyze  the question of aid fungibility  across the
" 0Provided  0,, the coefficient  of GN is not equal to I (for any sector  s), in which case the concept  of
fungibilitv is not verv meaningful  as it indicates  a complete  matching  of the donor's and the recipient's
preferences  for that sector.
' For  a comprehensive  review  of the foreign  aid literature.  see Moslev  et. al. l 1987], White  and Luttik
[1994]  and Obstfeld  [19951.
'2One  reason  for this has been  the difficultv  in obtaining  aid  data  bv sectors. More  on this below.11
sectoral classification  of expenditures  (Gupta [1993], McGuire [1978], Pack and Pack [1990, 19931).
In a study of foreign aid to Indonesia, Pack and Pack [1990] did not find any evidence of fungibilitv
across sectoral expenditures.  On the other hand, in their analysis of the Dominican Republic (Pack
and Pack [1993]) thev found evidence of substantial diversion of foreign aid away from its intended
purposes. The individual  country evidence while important, does not allow any generalization. The
question of the impact of aid on govemment expenditure in general, and fungibility  of aid resources
in particular, needs to be addressed in a cross-country time-series framework; this is precisely what
this paper does.
4.1 Data and choice of variables
Our empirical analysis uses annual data on developing countries from 1971 through  1990.
A panel database was constructed along three dimensions: (1) information on the aid variable; (2)
public spending variable; and (3) other control variables.
1. Data on Foreign Aid.  We used two different variables for foreign aid.  For total aid to a country.
we used the series on annual net disbursement of ODA that is put together by the Organization of
Economic  Co-operation and Development (OECD).  For sectoral aid, we would have liked to have
data on disbursement  of ODA over time and across countries.  However, such data exist on aid
commitments  only,  not  on aid disbursements.  We did not  want  to  use  sectoral  aid data  on
commitment for two reasons: First, the mapping between aid commitment and disbursement is far
from  one-to-one;  the disbursement data have a very disparate  time profile.  The data  on  aid
commitment  are very discontinuous with large swings from year to year while the data on aid12
disbursement  are very smooth. Second, the disbursement  data, being predetermined in most part, are
much less prone to the simultaneity problem with the government spending data.  In the empirical
analysis we  use  the  net disbursement of  concessionary loans  from all sources  (bilateral and
multilateral)  -- a component of ODA -- by sectors, over time and across countries.  13 We put together
this series from the World Bank database. Similar  information on grants -- the remaining component
of ODA -- was not available.
2. Data on Public Spending.  Our database on public spending consists of data on the functional
classification of public expenditure from two different sources:  (a) Government Finance Statistics
(GFS) -- a database of the Intemational  Monetary Fund (MIF); and (b) Database created by Easterly
and Rebelo [1993].  "  Among the available  data on public  spending, GFS's coverage is comprehensive
for central  government accounts but is quite restricted for the accounts of general (central plus sub-
national) government.  In addition, GFS data do not include spending by public sector enterprises.
The database of Easterly and Rebelo is not as rich and comprehensive as GFS but has information
on public  investment of the consolidated general government (which includes spending by all levels
of government as well as investments by public enterprises).
"3Using the available data on ODA commitments,  concessionarv  loans (both disbursement  and
commitment),  and  assuming  that the  relationship  between  concessionarv  loan  commitment  and disbursement  is
approximately  the  same  as the  relationship  between  ODA  commitment  and disbursement,  we  constructed  proxv
numbers  on ODA  disbursement  by sectors,  over time  and across  countries. This variable.  however.  was not
significant  in the  regression  analysis  (more  on  this below).
"'As  part  of this  research  we also  collected  public  spending  data from  various  issues  of Recent  Economic
Developments  (RED),  a document  prepared  annuallv  bv  the  IMF  for all  its member  countries. The  data reported
in RED  are  said to reflect  a more  accurate  description  of public  spending  in developing  countries  as it is based
on  detailed  analyses  of country  budgets  by  the  IMF  missions. Our  results  from  the RED  data, however.  were  not
very different from the results of the other two sources  (see below) and hence,  are not reported  for space
considerations.13
3. Data on Control Variables.  The database on explanatory  variables includes information on per
capita real GDP, infant mortality  rates. average schooling years in the labor force, school enrollment
ratios, military  expenditures  of neighboring  countries,  the share of agriculture in national income, and
the  Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties. (See below for an explanation on the link
between these variables and the model.)
The model in section 3 developed links  between foreign  aid and public spending assuming that
the observed mix of public expenditures results from a combination of the government's utility
maximizing  choice  using  fungible  -- domestic  and external  -- resources  and the  purchase  of goods
from  the non-fungible portion of aid.  In the empirical analysis we first estimate the impact of
aggregate foreign  aid on total government  spending  to examine  whether foreign aid is associated with
any resource mobilization  effort on the part of the recipient country.  We then estimate the effect of
foreign aid on the government's investment and consumption spending.  The impact of earmarked
sector-specific aid on components of government spending is estimated next.  Finally, we examine
the fungibility hypothesis.  The key explanatory variable in our analysis is the share of foreign aid
(aggregate as well  as sector-specific)  in GDP. By including  a few social, political and other economic
variables  in our set of explanatory  variables we attempt to capture the effect of the variable y,  -- the
minimum  quantities  of various public 2oods. Moreover, countries at different levels of development
tend to have different sizes of government (Wagner's law). To control for this effect, we include per
capita GDP at 1987 constant prices measured in US$ for each sample country.
Could  our analysis be subject to a simultaneity problem of the expenditure and foreign aid
variables? In deciding  the level and composition of foreign aid, donor agencies look at, among other
things, the economic, political and social indicators of the recipient country.  While the problem of14
simultaneity  exists in principle  in our analysis,  we attempt to minimize  it by (a) using aid disbursement
numbers which in most part are predetermined;  and (b) including a few economic, political and social
indicators of the recipient country as explanatory variables in the regression analysis. The latter is
consistent with the approaches of Boone [1994] and McGuire [1978].
4.2 Regression analysis
The method of least squares is used to estimate sequentially  the following three equations.
c
Gi,  =  aO,  +  al1 Aidj,, + E a,  ZC.,.t-  + E,'
for  country i (i=1,...,I  ) at  time t  (t= 1,..,T  );
C
G  E,  A  GN  +  8  A i,c-  (8 Ga  i  +°  a  +6  lt  + Eb6c-24c.l.,-I  + Vij
C=1  (8)
where El and  E2 are  current and capital  expen7ditures,  respectively;
and for each sector s (s= I,..,S)
s  c
Gi," 1 A=  js  - I  G  ,I  +XA 2 s Aid .,+  s  . t  3. kAid,,k+  C-3 s2  , t+  +t
k  s  c=I  (9)
where Al s  s; X2, s  =  (1 -ts+Ps  4); and  X3 k  =  Psk  for  kos.
Equation (9) is the system of sectoral expenditure equations derived in Section 3 (see equation (6)).15
Equations (7) and (8) are derived  by applying  the Stone-Geary utility function when there is only one
aggregate government spending variable and when government spending is divided into current and
capital expenditures, respectively.  In the latter cases, however, the aid variable is total foreign aid
given to a country in a year.  The variables in the regressions are:
(a)  Git:  Share of total government expenditure (including foreign aid)
in GDP for country i at time t;
(b)  G 1,E:  Share  of  government  expenditure  for  current  or  capital
purposes (including foreign aid) in GDP for country i at time
t, where E is current or capital expenditure;
(c)  Aidit:  Share of net disbursement of total  foreign aid in GDP for
country i at time t;
(d)  G 1 .,t:  Share of government  expenditure  (including foreign aid) in sector s in
GDP for country i at time t;
(e)  Gi,tN:  Share of total government expenditure  (net of foreign aid) in GDP for
country i at time t;
(f)  AidLsj:  Share  of net disbursement of foreign aid to  sector s in GDP for
country i at time t;
(g)  Zi, 1 -:  A vector of other control variables (infant mortality rates,  average
schooling years in labor force, average ratio of neighbor's military
expenditure to GDP, ratio of agriculture output to  GDP, Gastil's
[1989] index of political and civil liberties);
(h)  Ei,,,  vi,,  & flS:  White noise error terms for the three equations.
Table I presents the sample statistics  of government spending and foreign aid variables.  The
sample  includes 14 low- and middle-income  countries and the coverage is from 1971 through  1990
(see the data appendix for the sample selection criteria and the list of countries).  On average,16
developing countries spend roughly a quarter of their income (GDP) on total  public spending;
aggregate  public  investment accounts  for  9  percent  of  the  total  income.  The  average  net
disbursement of ODA to these countries during this period was 4 percent of their combined GDP,
with ranges from a negative transfer of one tenth of a percent to an assistance of over 22 percent.
The average amount of concessionary  loans to these countries  was 1.63 percent of GDP -- or roughly
40 percent of ODA.  As a ratio to total government spending, the sample averages of the two aid
variables were 15.5 and 6.3 percent, respec;tively.
Table 2 contains  the sample  statistics  of government  spending  and net disbursement of foreign
aid (concessionary  loans) by sectors. The six sectors: agriculture, defense, education, energy, health,
transport and communication  -- together account for over half of the total government spending and
nearly 90 percent of all concessionary loans.'5 Roughly 60 percent of all concessionary loans go to
two sectors -- energy, and transport and communication.
Table 3 reports the estimates of equations (7) and (8) which are estimated under the null
hypothesis  that the coefficients, o iand  6  i,of the country dummy variable are fixed parameters.  If,
however, the Hausman test rejects the null  hypothesis  that the appropriate model is fixed effects then
the random effects  model is estimated." 6 Equation (3.1) shows a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the share of total government expenditure in GDP and the share of the net
'5As far as we know,  there  is no "development"  assistance  to the defense  sector.
'6In the fixed  effects  model  a,  i  , the country  dummy  parameter,  is a fixed  coefficient.  In the random
effects  model  these  parameters  are  assumed  to be independent  random  variables  with a fixed  mean  and variance,
i.e.,  acc  = a 0 + e: . Hausman  has developed  a test  which  shows  that under  the  null  hypothesis  the fixed  effects
model  is appropriate  and the preferred  estimator  is least  squares  with  dummy  variables. If, however,  the fixed
effects  model  is rejected  in favor  of the  random  effects  model  then  the preferred  estimator  is generalized  least
squares. For  details,  see  Hausman  [19781.17
disbursement  of ODA. The regression shows  that a dollar increase in foreign aid leads to an increase
of 0.95 cents in total government spending.  There is no tax relief effect.  Increases in the net
disbursement  of  concessional  loans,  however,  are  far  more  stimulative of  total  government
expenditures, equation (3.2) shows that a dollar increase in concessionary loans leads to a $1.34
increase in government expenditures.  The likely reason why concessionary loans have a relatively
larger impact on government expenditures than ODA is that a portion of such loans have matching
requirements,  i.e., for every  dollar that a government spends on a specified activity it gets a matching
amount in concessionary  loans. Among the control variables,  the share of  agricultural output in GDP
-- a measure of level of development in a country  -- is the  only variable that is statistically  significant
in both the equations.  The negative coefficient suggests that countries that have a bigger share of
their  GDP from agriculture and are therefore relatively less developed, have relatively smaller
government  spending.  Equation  (3.3)  -- which includes expenditure shares according  to  the
economic classificatior -- indicates that roughly three-quarters of ODA is spent on government's
current  expenditure.  This may not be  necessarily bad because several components of current
expenditure,  such as operations and maintenance, may have higher rates of return than capital
expenditure." 7 The coefficient  of ODA in equation (3.5) shows that the remaining one-quarter of aid
(after accounting  for current expenditure) goes for capital expenditure. Comparing the coefficients
on the aid variable  with the coefficients  on the variable  "total spending net of aid," however, suggests
that at the margin more money is spent on current expenditure if the financing is from aid sources.
As  noted  by Easterly  and Rebelo  [1993], public investment data reported  in GFS for
'In  a study  of 43 developing  countries  over  20 years,  Devarajan,  Swaroop  and Zou [1996]  show  that
the only broad public expenditure  category  that is associated  with higher  economic  growth  is the current
expenditure.18
developing  countries  could have a bias  since they only cover the  investment of the  Central
Government.  To correct this problem they have constructed a new measure of public investment
which covers all levels of government as well as investments by public enterprises.  In order to
determine whether or not including such expenditure data qualitatively or quantitatively affect our
results, we employ  the Easterly and Rebelo measure of public investment. The relationship between
foreign aid and  public investment of the consolidated general government is also positive and
significant as illustrated in equations (4. 1) and (4.2) in Table 4.
These  regressions show that net concessionary loans are far more stimulative of public
investment  than ODA. Another interesting feature of these regressions is the size of the coefficients
on the aid variable. Only 20 and 32 cents of a dollar in ODA and concessionary loans, respectively,
go  for  public investment purposes.  The remaining aid presumably funds  either government
consumption or private investment and/or consumption. This, however, may not be an unintended
outcome of foreign aid for two reasons.  First, ODA funds are given to promote development and
welfare,  and therefore, by design, public investment may not be the sole purpose of such funds. 18 A
second  reason  could be that the standard definition of public investment does not  capture the
difference  between capital-stock-enhancing  (physical  as well  as human capital stock) and consumption
expenditures. For example, some researchers consider spending on public education as investment
(see Barro, 1991). As for the other variables in the regressions, neighbor's military expenditure and
infant  mortality rate,  both  have a  positive and  statistically significant relationship with  public
investment.
18Levy  [1987]  has argued  that  aid  transfers  include  very  heterogenous  components  (drought-related  food
transfers,  for example)  and  therefore  are  likely  to have  different  marginal  propensities  to consume  and invest.19
Many previous researchers, most notably Boone [1994], have argued that foreign aid does
not increase investment  and growth and in most cases aid is spent entirely on consumption." 9 Using
data on 96 countries  between 1971 and 1990, Boone shows that the marginal propensity to consume
from foreign  aid is insignificantly  different  from one, and the marginal propensity to invest (public and
private) is zero. Our results, on the other hand, show that foreign aid -- be it ODA or concessionary
loans -- has a positive and significant  impact on public investment. To check whether the impact of
aid on public investment could be crowding out private investment in our sample of countries, we
regress both the aid variables on total (public and private) investment. Equations (4.3) and (4.4)
show that both ODA and concessionary  loans have a positive and statistically significant relationship
with total investment.  In summary, our results do not support Boone's finding that foreign aid is
spent entirely  on consumption and not on investment. In our view the main reason why our finding
is different  from that of Boone is the difference  in the sample selection method.  Boone uses ten year
averaged data and hence, has only two data points (each based on ten or fewer observations) for each
country  in the sample.  We, on the other hand, use annual observations for each country in our
sample. While this emphasis on the time dimension reduces the number of countries in our sample,
we are able to capture more effectively  the impact of annual net disbursement of aid on that period's
government budget.
Table  5 has the estimates of equation (9) when GFS data on public spending are used.
" 9Such a finding,  however,  is not supported  by all studies. For example,  in a model  of public  fiscal
behavior  in developing  countries,  Heller  [  1975]  analyzed  the  impact  of an aid  variable  (total foreign  grants  to the
public sector from all sources)  on macro  variables  including  aggregate  public  investment  and consumption
spending. Based on a panel data set from  eleven  African  countries  (Nigeria,  Ghana,  Zambia,  Kenya,  Uganda,
Tanzania,  Malawi,  Liberia,  Ethiopia,  Tunisia,  and  Morocco),  his  findings  indicate  that foreign  aid  causes  a strong
shift away  from  public  consumption  and  toward  investment.20
Regressions  reported in this table examine  the link between  the net disbursement  of concessionary
loans  to a particular  sector and public  spending  in that sector. In each of the six regressions  --  one
each for education,  health, energy,  agriculture,  transport and communication,  and defense  --  the
coefficient  on the variable  G ".",,  which  is statistically  significant  in all regressions,  indicates  how
the government  distributes  an additional  dollar  that it gets from all resources  net of concessionary
loans. It is interesting  to compare  this allocation  at the margin  with  the average  allocation  (of total
government  spending)  given  in Table  2. There  are two points  worth mentioning:  (1) the average  and
marginal  allocations  are more  or less  the same  in  the defense  sector  and therefore  the share  of defense
in total spending  is fixed;  and  (2) the transport and communication  sector  receives  a higher  marginal
allocation than its average indicating  that the share of this sector in the composition  of public
expenditure  continues  to increase.  In the past two decades  concessionary  loans  -- certainly  in dollar
value if not in numbers  -- have mostly  funded economic  infrastructure. Data from our sample
countries confirm  this;  loans  (in dollar value)  to two sectors -- transport and communication,  and
energy  -- account  for roughly  29 and 31 percent  of all concessionary  loans  (see Table  2).  Data on
loans also show that most of the variation  is in these two sectors (see standard  deviations  in Table
2).21
Box 1:  EsTMATE.S  OF FuNGiBILiTy  PARAMETER  (0,) BASED  ON LEAST  SQUARES  REGRESSION
Hypothesis Testing on Estimated 
4
k Sector  Public Spending  4k  (SE[4k])
fk=  l  l  >  fk>  °  fk  °  All
G  -0.60 (1.58)  V
Education
G?'  0.52 (0.39)  V
G  1.33 (1.18)
Health
CJB  0.35 (0.81)  /
G  0.65 (0.09)
Energy
GP-
G  1.08 (0.16)  i  .'
Agriculture
6"'  0.88 (0.10)  /  /
G  0.09 (0.24)  /
T&C
0p'  0.07 (0.24)  /
Notes:
(1) 'G'  is total central government  spending from GFS; GP'  is total public investment  from Easterly and Rebelo.
(2) 'T&C'  is transport and communication.
(3)  /  indicates that the null hypothesis  cannot be rejected at 5% significance level.
(4) '4:, =  ' tests for full fungibility; 'I  > 4i > O' tests for partial fungibility;  and '4, = O' tests for non-fungibility.
(5) 'All'  indicates  that we cannot reject any null hypothesis within a reasonable range.
To analyze aid fungibility  we need to look at the estimate of 4)  -- the fungibility  parameter.
Table 5 contains  the OLS estimates of equation (9) which does not directly give us the estimates of
s..  We, however, solve for 4),  from the other coefficient estimates and present it in Box 1.  Our
results  indicate that loans to the transport and communication sector are fully non-fungible, i.e., a
dollar in concessionary loan given to the sector is fully spent in the sector.  The coefficient 4)  T&C iS
0.09 which is insignificantly  different from zero.  This can also be seen from Table 5 where equation
(5.5)  has a positive and statistically significant relationship between loans to  the transport and22
communication  sector and the public  spending  in that sector; the coefficient on the aid variable is 0.92
which is statistically  not different  from 1. Moreover, as indicated in Table 5.5, loans to the transport
and  communication sector appear to have a stimulative impact on public spending in health and
energy sectors and a dampening effect on public spending on education. Other estimates of 4)  (see
Box  1) indicate that loans to agriculture and energy to the sample countries have been fungible.
However, for the education and health sectors we can not reject any of the null hypotheses of interest
(i.e., 0< 4)  < 1). We believe that based on the available data for these sectors the power of the test
is not enough to reject any reasonable hypothesis.  In recent years, the donor community has been
increasingly  concerned that development  assistance  is being  used directly or indirectly to fund military
expenditures.  Data from our sample countries do not support the hypothesis that foreign aid is
diverted for military purposes (see Table 5, equation (5.6)).
Table 6 reports  the regression results when the dependent variable is taken to be sectoral
public investment. Once again we find that concessionary loans to the transport and communication
sector are fully non-fungible. In equation (6.4), the coefficient on the loan variable is positive and
statistically not different from I indicating that a dollar given to the sector pretty much ends up
increasing  the public  investment  in that sector by the same amount (the coefficient 4)  TaC,  given in Box
1, is 0.07 which continues to be insignificantly  different from zero).  Moreover, the loan stimulates
investment in agriculture and health sectors. 20
20For  space  considerations  we do not report  the regression  results  based  on public  spending  data from
the  Recent  Economic Developments. The  results  are  siniilar  to the  ones  reported  from  the  other  two sources.23
4.3 Joint estimation of the sectoral equations
Our  model of  aid fungibility outlined in Section 3 yields a system of estimable sectoral
equations that are nonlinear in the structural parameters (equation (6)).  In each of these equations,
there are K aid fungibility  parameters {4,k, k =J,...,K}, where K (￿  S) is the number of sectors that
receive earmarked aid.  The results reported in Table 5 and Table 6 are based on independent least
square estimates  of each sectoral equation as given in equation (9) which is basically a modified form
of equation (6).  We now jointly estimate the sectoral equations and impose the cross-equation
restriction  that the aid fungibility parameter 
4 k  (k-=l,...,K) is the same across all equations.  The
system of equations that we estimate is given by
K  C
G.s=t  +Ps  N  G+(I-4¢  +j5  4s)  Aids,+t  PsFk Aid+,k,t  +E  +3, Zc.i,t-l+Errorr,St)
I,S,t  0,  s  tj  ~~~krs  c=I  (10)
for  each sector s  (s=l,...,S),  country i  (i=l,...,I),  time t  (t=l,...,T).
To estimate the above system of equations, we use the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) technique as discussed in Hansen and Singleton [1982].21 Coefficient estimates and other
statistics  are reported in Table 7 (using public expenditure data from GFS) and Table 8 (using public
expenditure data from Easterly and Rebelo).
To eliminate  fixed  or random effects,  we differenced  the foreign aid and government spending
variables on the right-hand side in equation (10).  The overidentification tests do not indicate any
model misspecification problems; the Chi-square tests reported in the tables indicate that the null
2 "For  estimation  we  use a GMM  program  written  in the software  Gauss  by Hansen,  Heaton  and Ogaki
[1993].24
hypothesis of model being misspecified  is not rejected.  The hypothesis testing on aid fungibility  is
described  in Box 2.  The coefficient, XT&C continues to be  insignificantly  different from zero which
indicates that loans to the transport and communication sector are fully non-fungible.  This result
holds whether we use total central  government  spending  numbers  in the transport and communication
sector from the GFS or total public investment numbers from Easterly and Rebelo.  The results for
the agriculture and energy sectors are mixed. Foreign aid to the energy sector is fungible when we
use total central  government spending  data from the GFS; based on public investment data, however,
the null hypothesis that 4 is within a reasonable range (i.e., O  +  ￿  1) is not rejected.  For the
agriculture  sector we find that aid is fungible when public investment numbers are used; for the
central  government spending data the test suggests that only unreasonable values of 4 are not
rejected. In the social sectors, our results indicate that foreign aid to education is fungible when we
use public investment numbers in education.25
Box 2: JOINTLY ESTIMATED  FUNGIBILITY  PARAMETERS (,K)
Sector  Public  Hypothesis  Testing  on Estimated  4k
Spending  1Pk  (SE[IkJ)  ck =  1  1 >  k> 0  k = 0  All  Unreasonable
G  -2.99  (2.61)  /
Education
Gp'  1.57 (0.41)  /  /
G  -3.96 (1.61)  /
Health
GP'  6.67 (2.06)  /
G  0.92 (0.06)  /  /
Energy
EGIP,  - 45.44 (66.08)  /
G  1.90  (0.15)  /
Agriculture
0"'  0.99  (0.06)  /  /
G  -0.20  (0.28)  /
T&C
IGp'  |  -0.25 (0.13)  /
G  1.68  (0.20)  /
Other
G^1  98.57  (9.80)  /
Notes:
(1) See Box 1;
(2) 'Other'  is public spending not allocated to the specified sectors; 'Unreasonable' indicates that only unreasonable
parameter values are not rejected.
4.4 Foreign aid and poverty alleviation
Lack of adequate and consistent data, particularly time-series, on poverty indicators (e.g.,
income by decile) in most developing countries-precludes a systematic analysis  of the relationship
between foreign  aid and poverty alleviation.  It is possible,  however, to measure the impact of foreign
aid on a few human  development  indicators  such as infant  mortality  rate, school enrollment ratios etc.
Equation  (9.1) in Table 9 reports the regression of the rate of change in infant mortality on net
concessionary loans given to the health sector.  The one period lagged value of the concessionary26
loan has a negative and significant  relationship with infant mortality. The coefficient indicates that
if the health sector received  concessionary  loans equal to one percent of GDP, infant mortality would
fall  by 31.7 percent.  Given the mean value of the loan variable (0.007 perecnt of GDP), this means
that  doubling the existing amount of concessionary loans to the health sector would reduce infant
mortality  by 2 percent. In Bangladesh,  one of our sample  countries, infant mortality in 1992 was 1  10
per 1000 live  birth. A 2 percent reduction in infant mortality would mean 2.2 lives (per 1000 of live
births) would be saved; if there are 5 million live births in a year in Bangladesh, the 2 percent
reduction would save 11,000 infants. While concessionary loans to the health sector in developing
countries  have been historically  low -- accounting for only .3 percent of all concessionary loans (see
Table  2) -- the evidence seems to  suggest that the poor are receiving the benefits of these aid
programs. The other significant  variable in the regression is the real per-capita GDP which has a
negative  relationship  with infant mortality.  The sign is what would be expected: rich countries have
low infant mortality. The positive but statistically  insignificant  relationship between infant mortality
and public health spending  is not necessarily  surprising. Together these results indicate that the intra-
sectoral allocation of public  resources in the health sector is not pro-poor.  Boone [ 1994] reports that
foreign aid has no significant impact on improvements in infant mortality.  Our analysis also shows
that there is no significant  impact of aid on infant mortality when we regress the latter on aggregate
aid. 22 However, we find that foreign  aid given  to the health sector in the form of concessionary loans
has improved infant mortality.  These results have important implications for policy.  Perhaps, a
more effective way of giving aid to developing countries might be to agree on a public expenditure
mJsing  the  aggregate  aid  variable,  ODA,  we  also found  no impact  of aid  on infant  mortality  (results  not
reported  in the paper  for space  considerations).27
program in areas that are critical for development.
Our data do not support any significant  links  between aid to the education sector and primary
school enrollment (see equation (9.2) in Table 9).  In fact, none of the independent variables is
statistically  significant. It is possible that either the model is misspecified  or the lag structure of the
independent variables is not rich enough to decipher any kind of relationship.
5. Conclusion
This purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship between foreign aid and public
spending  in developing  countries. Using a model of aid fungibility,  we derived an equation that could
be used to estimate  the effect of foreign  aid on the aggregate as well as various components of public
spending.  The empirical results showed that a dollar given in official development assistance to
developing countries does not lead to a tax relief effect; instead, it causes government spending to
increase  by a dollar.  Of this increase in government spending, roughly three-quarters is spent on
current expenditure and the remaining  quarter on capital expenditure. One dollar in concessionary
loan -- a component of the aggregate development assistance --  however, is far more stimulative of
total government spending. Our results also showed  that a fraction of development assistance shows
up in increased public investment. However, our results do not support previous research findings
that foreign aid is spent entirely on consumption and not on total (public and private) investment.
Is it surprising  to find that the majority  of foreign aid does not go for public investment? We
believe  the answer is no for at least two reasons: First, increasing public investment may not be the
sole  purpose  of development assistance.  In fact,  not  all of ODA is designed to  fund public
investment;  for example,  ODA includes emergency assistance to countries in need.  Second, several28
components of government consumption, most notably expenditures on basic educaion and health
and  on  operations  and  maintenance, may have higher rates  of return than  public investment
(Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou,  1996).
In analyzing  the impact  of foreign aid on different components of public spending, we found
that concessionary  loans given to the transport and communication sector are fully non-fungible. It
could be that restrictions placed by donor agencies on loans are effective due to the lumpiness of
investment in the sector and therefore, are easy to monitor.  Another possible reason could be that
grants  in these sectors frequently have a matching requirement.  On the other hand, energy sector
loans have been converted into fungible  monies  with a portion of funds leaking into the transport and
communication sector.  We also find that aid to the agriculture and education sectors are fungible
though the evidence  on the latter is weak. If these fungibility  results stand up to further scrutiny, they
have  important  implications for  policy.  The  widespread focus  on  project  financing by  the
international donor community could be misleading. The success of a donor-funded project is not
just its rate of return; what is more important is how much do these funds crowd-out the recipient
government's own spending  in that area and what do the government's released funds finance at the
margin. In this context, however, we did not find evidence of concessionary funds being diverted for
military purposes.
Using available  data on human development indicators we found that concessionary loans to
the health sector have been helpful in lowering infant mortality. Total public spending in the health
sector, on the other hand has no significant  impact on infant mortality. This leads us to believe that
perhaps, linking  foreign  aid with an agreed upon public expenditure program in areas that are critical
for development might be an effective way of transferring resources to developing countries.29
Table 1
Sample  statistics  of govermment  expenditure  and foreign  aid as shares  of GDP
{in  percent  (except  standard  deviation))
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum
1. Government expenditure
Total expenditure (G)  25.7  11.0  11.0  60.1
Current expenditure (Cur.)  22.4  9.5  8.5  49.5
Capital expenditure (Cap.)  6.5  3.2  2.6  18.8
Public investment (PI)  9.0  4.6  2.4  22.9
Total (public & private)  investment (I)  14.9  12.7  0.02  45.7
2. Foreign aid
Official  Development Assistance (ODA)  3.99  4.12  -0.10  22.59
[Ratio to total expenditure]  [15.531  [-0.911  [37.591
Concessionary loan  1.63  1.96  -0.18  13.56
[Ratio to total expenditure]  [6.34]  [-1.64]  [22.56]
Notes:
(a)  These numbers are based on 128 observations from a sample of 14 developing countries (for details see the data
appendix); current and capital expenditure numbers are based on 89 observations..
(b)  Data Sources:
'Total Expenditure' is total consolidated central govemment expenditure; current and capital are also consolidated
central govemment expenditures (Source: Govemment Finance Statistics,  IMAF);
'Public Investment' is total consolidated public investment (Source: Easterly and Rebelo [1993]);
'Public  and Private  Investment'  is gross  domestic  investment  from national  accounts (Source: BESD, the World Bank
database),
'ODA'  is net annual disbursement of official  development assistance (Source: OECD, Paris);
'Concessionary  Loan' is net disbursement  of concessionary  loans from all bilateral  and multilateral  agencies (Source:
BESD, The World Bank).30
Table  2
Sample  statistics  of government  expenditure  and foreign  aid
{Mean  expressed  in percentage  (standard  deviation  in parenthesis)}
Sectors  Total expenditure (G)  Public investment (PI)  Concessionary  loan
1..Agriculture
Share in GDP  1.61  1.11  0.23
(0.93)  (0.75)  (0.38)
Share in G, PI, and loan  6.82  12.95  23.39
(3.74)  (8.76)  (44.28)
2. Defense
Share in GDP  3.03  n.a.
(1.88)
Share in G, PI, and loan  12.08  n.a.  - -
(5.98)
3. Education
Share in GDP  3.85  0.56  0.06
(1.46)  (0.41)  (0.08)
Share in G, PI, and loan  16.24  6.12  5.70
(6.23)  (3.06)  (12.91)
4. Energy
Share in GDP  0.58  n.a.  0.29
(0.71)  (0.36)
Share in G, PI, and loan  2.37  n.a.  31.24
(2.99)  (114.9)
5. Health
Share in GDP  1.14  0.31  0.01
(0.52)  (0.22)  (0.02)
Share in G, PI, and loan  4.89  3.79  0.31
(2.57)  (2.42)  (4.35)
6. Transport and Communication (T&C)
Share in GDP  1.98  2.26  0.32
(1.56)  (1.52)  (0.49)
Share in G, PI, and loan  8.62  24.45  29.06
(6.01)  (10.55)  (50.12)
Notes:
(a)  See Table I for infornation on the sample; 'n.a.'  indicates not available.31
Table  3
Regression  results:  Government  expenditure  on foreign  aid
{Government  expenditure  data from  GFS}
Equation  (3.1)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.5)  (3.6)
Dependent Variable  G/GDP  G/GDP  Cur./GDP  Cur./GDP  Cap./GDP  Cap.GDP
Constant  1.80
(0.29)
G Netf  aid/GDP  0.63  0.65  0.35  0.35
(15.33)  (14.44)  (9.15)  (8.80)
Share of ODA in GDP  0.95  0.72  0.29
(5.82)  (10.59)  (4.65)
Share of concessionary  1.34  1.22  0.27
loan in GDP  (5.08)  (8.97)  (1.19)
Real per-capita  GDP  0.01  0.01  -0.002  -0.004  0.002  0.002
(1.67)  (1.10)  (-0.43)  (1.05)  (0.59)  (0.80)
Neighbor's military  0.33  0.43  -0.10  -0.53  0.08  0.04
expenditure in GDP [lag(-1)]  (1.04)  (1.26)  (-0.76)  (-0.37)  (0.64)  (0.30)
Average schooling in  -1.78  -1.12  3.74  2.92  -3.58  -1.95
labor force [lag(-I)]  (-1.04)  (-0.61)  (4.19)  (2.90)  (-4.27)  (-2.66)
Infant mortality  rate [lag(-1)]  0.09  0.06  0.06  0.01  -0.05  -0.02
(1.51)  (0.94)  (2.19)  (0.26)  (-1.91)  (-0.89)
Share of agriculture  -0.63  -0.53  -0.12  -0.09  0.07  0.15
Output in GDP [lag(-1)]  (-2.69)  (-2.09)  (-0.94)  (-0.63)  (0.59)  (1.55)
Gastil index of political  0.39  0.32  -0.17  -0.48  0.04  -0.03
and civil liberties  (0.64)  (0.50)  (-0.50)  (-1.35)  (0.12)  (-0.10)
AdjustedR-square  0.87  0.84  0.97  0.97  0.79  0.19
Observations  128  128  89  89  89  89
Model  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Random
Notes:
(a)  'Model'  indicates whether the country dummies in the regression represent a Fixed effects or a Random effects
model. The test is based on Hausman [1978].
(b)  For regressions that represent a Fixed effects model, coefficients  of country dummies are not reported.
(c)  t-statistics  in parentheses.32
Table  4
Regression  results:  Government  expenditure  on foreign  aid
{Public  investment  data from  Easterly  and Rebelo,  Total  investment  from  National  Accounts)
Equation  (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)
Dependent Variable  Public Invest./GDP  Public Invest./GDP  Invest./GDP  Invest./GDP
Share of ODA in GDP  0.20  0.81
(2.81)  (5.05)
Share of concessionary  0.32  1.18
loan in GDP  (2.55)  (4.05)
Real per-capita GDP  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02
(4.92)  (4.70)  (3.56)  (3.06)
Neighbor's military  0.51  0.52  0.49  0.55
expenditure in GDP [lag  (-1)]  (3.69)  (3.73)  (1.57)  (1.69)
Average schooling in  -0.36  -0.33  -1.73  -1.40
labor force [lag(-1)]  (-0.47)  (-0.44)  (-1.02)  (-0.79)
Infant mortality rate [lag (-1)]  0.07  0.06  0.13  0.10
(2.59)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (1.64)
Share of agriculture  -0.14  -0.13  -0.38  -0.32
output in GDP [lag (-1)]  (-1.37)  (-1.29)  (-1.64)  (-1.33)
Gastil index of political  -0.28  -0.30  0.66  0.59
and civil liberties  (-1.05)  (-1.12)  (1.08)  (0.93)
Adjusted.R-square  0.85  0.85  0.66  0.63
Observations  128  128  128  128
Model  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed
Notes:
(a)  t-statistics  in parentheses.33
Table  5
Regression  results:  Sectoral  government  expenditure  and concessionary  loan
{Government  expenditure  data from  GFS)
Equation  (5.1)  (5.2)  (5.3)  (5.4)  (5.5)  (5.6)
Dependent Variable  Edu./GDP  Health/GDP  Energy/GDP  Agri./GDP  T&C/GDP  Defense/GDP
Constant  4.12  1.19  -0.63  -2.07  2.08  3.36
(1.49)  (1.28)  (-0.51)  (-1.20)  (3.44)  (0.89)
GNetofI/GDP  0.08  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.10  0.11
(4.94)  (4.32)  (1.99)  (2.75)  (5.57)  (5.10)
LoanEdutbw/GDP  1.55  0.01  0.16  0.05  0.52  0.71
(1.08)  (0.03)  (0.27)  (0.05)  (0.31)  (0.38)
Loan Hea'th  /GDP  -3.21  -0.31  3.07  3.45  1.10  5.19
(-0.73)  (0.23)  (1.61)  (1.29)  (0.21)  (0.91)
LoanE/GDP  -0.71  0.12  0.36  0.21  0.17  0.02
(-1.21)  (1.84)  (3.82)  (1.59)  (3.75)  (0.07)
Loan 'O"'  /GDP  0.56  0.19  0.09  -0.05  -0.01  0.21
(2.22)  (2.45)  (0.82)  (-0.32)  (-0.03)  (0.65)
Loan T&C/GDP  -0.59  0.14  0.16  0.21  0.92  0.36
(-3.01)  (2.44)  (1.92)  (1.77)  (3.98)  (1.44)
Loan  /GDP  -0.05  0.02  0.01  0.06  0.04  -0.01
(-1.65)  (2.30)  (0.79)  (3.25)  (1.09)  (-0.35)
Real per-capita  GDP  0.0003  -0.0001  0.001  0.0003  -0.0002  0.0002
(0.26)  (-0.15)  (1.44)  (0.45)  (-0.17)  (0.15)
Neighbor's military  -0.12  0.003  0.02  -0.004  -0.04  0.01
expenditure in GDP [lag (-1)] (-1.28)  (0.17)  (0.41)  (-0.12)  (-0.67)  (0.16)
Average schooling in  -0.19  -0.08  -0.12  0.46  -1.65  -0.29
labor force [lag (-1)]  (-0.68)  (-0.89)  (-0.99)  (2.55)  (-4.87)  (-0.75)
Infant mortality rate [lag (-1)]  0.01  -0.003  0.002  0.01  -0.03  -0.01
(1.37)  (-0.91)  (0.53)  (1.60)  (-2.38)  (-1.12)
Share of agriculture  -0.05  0.008  0.02  -0.004  -0.08  -0.03
output in GDP [lag  (-1)]  (-1.17)  (0.65)  (1.12)  (-0.18)  (-1.92)  (-0.56)
Gastil index of political  -0.17  -0.06  -0.06  -0.02  -0.07  -0.03
and civil liberties  (-1.56)  (-1.92)  (1.23)  (-0.32)  (-0.57)  (-0.2)
Adjusted R-squared  0.04  0.24  0.18  0.09  0.89  0.34
Observations  128  128  128  128  128  128
Model  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random
*t-statistics  in parentheses.34
Table  6
Regression  Results:  Sectoral  government  expenditure  and  concessionary  loan
(Sectoral  public  investment  data from  Easterly  and Rebelo}
Equation  (6.1)  (6.2)  (6.3)  (6.4)
Dependent Variable  Education"'  /GDP  Healthp'  /GDP  Agriculturep'  /GDP  T&Cp'  /GDP
Constant  -0.55  0.75  --  0.35
(-0.82)  (1.47)  - - (0.12)
G Nd of 'Om/GDp  0.01  0.002  -0.01  0.004
(2.07)  (0.73)  (-1.92)  (0.19)
Loan E"hC"I'O  /GDP  0.49  -0.49  -0.42  2.89
(1.27)  (-1.93)  (-0.68)  (1.73)
Loan 11'ateaGDP  -0.56  0.65  4.18  -0.81
(-0.44)  (0.80)  (2.20)  (-0.15)
Loan Arclu  /GDP  0.07  0.007  0.11  1.29
(1.16)  (0.17)  (1.03)  (0.99)
Loan ThC  /GDP  -0.01  0.09  0.31  1.07
(-0.19)  (2.50)  (3.68)  (4.57)
Loan Other  /GDP  -0.0003  0.003  0.02  0.06
(-0.03)  (0.48)  (1.81)  (1.69)
Real per-capita GDP  0.0002  0.0001  0.003  0.003
(0.69)  (0.69)  (5.14)  (2.64)
Neighbor's military  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.15
expenditure in GDP [lag (-1)]  (0.59)  (1.00)  (0.90)  (2.50)
Average schooling in  0.09  -0.06  -0.34  -0.47
Labor force [lag  (-1)]  (1.18)  (-1.18)  (-2.55)  (-1.48)
Infant mortality  rate [lag (-1)]  0.005  -0.0003  0.01  0.005
(2.43)  (-0.30)  (1.96)  (0.51)
Share of agriculture  -0.002  4).004  0.007  -0.02
output in GDP [lag (-1)]  (-0.23)  (-0.624)  (0.063)  (-0.55)
Gastil index of political  -0.03  -0.04  -0.10  0.02
and civil liberties  (-1.01)  (-2.27)  (-2.30)  (0.13)
Adjusted R-squared  0.13  0.64  0.84  0.06
Observations  128  128  128  128
Model  Random  Random  Fixed  Random
* t-statistics in parentheses.35
Table 7
Joint estimation  of sectoral  equations:  Sectoral  government  expenditure  and concessionary  loan
{Govermment  expenditure  data from  GFS}
Equation  (7.1)  (7.2)  (7.3)  (7.4)  (7.5)  (7.6)
Dependent variable  Edu./GDP  Health./GDP  EnergyiGDP  Agri./GDP  T&C/GDP  Defense/GDP
Constant  -1.73  -0.15  -0.53  0.65  -0.05  -1.04
(0.78)  (0.18)  (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.65)  (0.72)
Real per-capita GDP  0.0007  0.0001  (.0002  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.0003
(0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0 00011)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)
Infant mortality rate [lag (-1)]  0.0005  0.0001  0.0014  - 0.0018  0.0039  0.0031
(0.0022)  (0.0005)  (0 0008)  (0.0015)  (0.0022)  (0.0021)
Neighbor's military  0.0587  -0.0013  0.0098  -0.0192  -0.0135  0.0150
expenditure in GDP [lag (-I)]  (0.0250)  (0.0066)  (0.0103)  (0.0116)  (0.0233)  (0.0229)
Share of agriculture  0.0274  0.0034  0.0'.69  -0.0058  -0.0060  0.0159
output in GDP [lag (-1)]  (0.0129)  (0.0036)  (0D0051)  (0 0066)  (0.0129)  (0.0134)
Common to all equations:
.11  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.07  0.09
(0.03)  (0.01)  (0 01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
-2.99  -3.96  0.92  1.90  -0.21
(2.61)  (1.61)  (0.06)  (0.15)  (0.28)
C/ii-square  13.4
Probability  0.99
Degrees of Freedom  30
Observations:  104
*standard error  in parentheses.36
Table 8
Joint estimation  of sectoral  equations:  Sectoral  government  expenditure  and concessionary  loan
Government  expenditure  data from  Easterlv  and Rebelo}
i  qtuatioi  (8.1)  (8.2)  (8.3)  (8.4)
lDependent  Variable  Edu.:GDP  Health/GDP  Agriculture.GDP  T&CiGDP
Constant  -0.07  -0.01  0.05  -0.02
(0.13)  (0.05)  (0.  1  1)  (0.33)
.c1  [pcr-capita  GDP  (.0(10l  -0.0002  -0.0004  0.0001
(0.0006)  (0.0004)  ((.0006)  (0.0001)
hfli.il mortality  rate  [lag(-1)]  0.00012  0.0003  -0.0003  0.0001
(0.(009)  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0023)
Neighbor's military  0.0039  -0.0004  -0.0008  0.0096
E:xpendittire  in GDP [Iag(-I)]  (0.0071)  (0.0041)  (0.0077)  (0.0377)
Comnton  to  all equations:
3  (.()01  0.0004  0.003  0.017
(0.002)  (0.(001)  (0.004)  (0.024)
1.57  45.44  0.99  -0.25
(0.41)  (66.07)  (0.06)  (0.13)
Chi-square  14.188
Proboabilitv  0.72
Degrees  of Freedom  18
()b.ervalions.  104
*standard error in parentheses.37
Table 9
Regression results: Social  indicators on foreign aid
Equation  (9.1)  (9.2)
Dependent Variable  A log infanit  mortality  A log primar, schoolinig
Constant  9.78  -(128
(1.56)  (-0.03)
Share of health expenditure  0 12
in GDP  (0.12)
Share of health expenditure  0.62
in GDP [lag (- I)]  (0.60)
Share of concessionary  loan  -16.18
to health sector in GDP  (-  1.  I 1)
Share of concessionarv  loan  -31.66
to the health sector in GDP [lag (-1)1  (-2.25)
Share of education expenditure  -0.15
in GDP  (-0.27)
Share of education expenditure  0.70
in Gl>P [lag (-I)]  (1.18)
Share of concessionary  loan  0.35
to the education sector in GDP  (0.04)
Share of concessionary loan to  2.71
the education sector in GDP [Lag (-I)]  (0.31)
Real per-capita GDP  -2.11  - 0.28
(-2.75)  (-0.22)
Populationi  grovwth  rate  -0.16  0.19
(-0.16)  (0.12)
Adjusted R-square  0.17  0.02
Observations  111  111
Alodel  Random  Random
* t-statistics in parentheses.38
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Data Appendix
A panel database  (annual data from  1971 through  1990 for developing countries) was
constructed for the empirical analysis. Three different sets of expenditure data -- total and sectoral
expenditure  data at the consolidated central government level from GFS and RED; and total and
sectoral  public investment data at the consolidated general government level from Easterly and
Rebelo  [1993]  --  and  two  sets  of  foreign  aid  data  --  net  disbursement  of  aggregate  overseas
development  assistance  from OECD and net disbursement of concessionary loans (overall as well as
by sectors) --  were collected and used in the regression analysis.
I. SAMPLE  SELECTION
The sample used in the empirical analysis is based on 128 observations from 14 developing
countries (see the country list below).
To collect our sample we started with the database of Easterly and Rebelo [1993] which has
a new measure of public  investment  -- one which incorporates investment by all levels of government
as well as investment  by public  enterprises. Data on public  investment in GFS and RED, on the other
hand, are incomplete in this sense.  To construct a meaningful panel for the statistical analysis, we
included  a c.ountry  from the Easterly and Rebelo database in our sample, if  at least 3  5 percent of the
annual observations  were available on each of the public investment variables used in the regression
analysis. From a total of 166 countries,  twenty seven were chosen. Four of these 27 countries were
dropped  because they did not  have related GFS expenditure data on the same variables.  The
objective was to have the same set of countries from all the three different databases.  In the final
analysis, only 14 of the 23 countries were chosen as only these had the required information on all
the relevant variables (including the control variables) in the regression.
II. COUNTRIES
The  classification  -- by  regions  and  by  income  levels  --  is according  to  the  World  Bank41
Classification of Country Group (World Bank, 1994).
A. Country List
BANGLADESH,  COSTA  RICA, ECUADOR,  EGYPT, HONDURAS,  KENYA, MEXICO, MALAWI,
MALAYSIA,  PERU, SiERRA  LEONE,  THAILAND,  TURKEY,  ZAIRE.
B. Country Groups: Regional Classification
2  East  Asia countries,  I  South Asia country, 4 sub-Saharan Africa countries, 5 Latin
American and Caribbean countries, and 2 EMENA countries.
C. Country Groups: By Income
7 Low-income countries, 5 Lower-middle-income countries, and 2 Upper-middle-income
countries.
III. DATA  SOURCE
(1)  Data  on  Public Expenditures:  Public irivestment data  from Easterly and  Rebelo  [19931;
Government  Finance Statistics  (GFS), Various issues  of RED's, International Finance Statistics (IFS)
-- all from the International  Monetary  Fund; and National Accounts from the World Bank Economic
and Social Database(BESD).
(2)  Data on Foreign Aid: From Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
Countries:  Disbursements,  Commitments,  Economic  Indicators,  Paris,  France;  International
Economics Department, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
(3) Exchange Rate:  International Currency Analysis,  Inc.,  World Currency Yearbook, New York.
(4) Infant Mortality Rate: UN Social Indicators.42
(5) Average Schooling Years in the Labor Force: Barro [1994], Nehru [1993].
(6) Military Expenditures of Neighboring Countries: Landau [1994].
(7) Agriculture Output to GDP Ratio: United Nations.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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